In this article we study the behavior of a group of economic agents in the context of cooperative game theory, interacting according to rules based on the Potts Model with suitable modifications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a game where N players can invest their money (up to some upper limit) on some public-fund asset. The fund manager, as a rule, doubles the amount of money received and divides it equally among all N investors. Depending on the total amount each player invested, some might end up making a profit while others may lose money. Assume that players have no information whatsoever about their co-players' moves. The question is:
what is the best move a player can make? If we adopt one of the tenets of classical game theory, namely that players are completely rational, then there are two possible solutions to the problem which maximize profit (when all invest the maximum amount possible, thus doubling their initial capital) or minimize losses (no one invests anything). In the real world however people are not rational in the sense of classical game theory and factors as expectations about the behavior of other players or some sort of insider information might play a role when deciding how to invest.
The irrationality of market agents is one of a myriad of factors which account for the high complexity of financial markets and the difficulty in modelling them. Markets may also be affected by political turmoil, unseasonable weather variations and the like. In the past few years models have been introduced in order to throw some light into the behavior of markets, mainly with aims at forecasting long-term behavior see for example [3, 4] . These models, which have the advantage of being either analytically or numerically treatable and usually use some kind of data input from real markets, are nonetheless unable to take into account the human factor in decision-making scenarios. To circumvent these difficulties a new approach, inspired on the ideias of statistical mechanics has been suggested [5] , where one extends the set of causal factors in decision-making scenarios from the individualspecific to group determinants of behavior: players' decisions are not market-mediated but rely on group-level influences.
With these ideias in mind our aim in this work is to extend the model for the game discussed above through the introduction of cooperation, i.e. we allow agents to have partial information on the decision of its immediate neighbors, in a way to be described precisely in what follows. Furthermore, we allow for some kind of randomness, the only thing known a priori being the probability of some decision, and not the decision itself. In this way we hope to describe the average behavior of a large group of agents without entering in the details of a realistic (and certainly very difficult) theory on psychological state of each agent.
Our main interest will be to see how is the average behavior of a (large) group of cooper-ative economic agents. Each agent, labelled by the index i, is allowed to invest an amount σ i . Before the investment, the agent i exchange information with agent i + 1 (defined as the neighbor of i; this concept is symmetric, i.e., i is also neighbor of i + 1). Based on that information agents make decisions as to how much they will invest according to some probability distribution parameterized in terms of a two real variables: J and β. The first measures how strongly people interact with each other (group-level influence) while the later is a measure of how strongly a player might deviate from the group. To model this we choose a suitably defined function which measures the probability of i investing σ i given that i + 1 would like to invest σ i+1 . In a way to be precisely formalized later, β allows us to change the expected behavior of each agent.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we explain the model and make the connection with statistical mechanics. Using the standard transfer matrix technique [8] we analyze in section 3 some integrable cases (q = 2 and q = 3) in order to gain information about how the average investment changes as a function of β. In section 4 we numerically evaluate the evolution for q ≥ 4. We introduce a method for calculating the investment using derivatives of the biggest eigenvalue, which is based on the use of 5 points in a graphic. We finish the paper with some conclusions and perspectives.
II. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM: THE POTTS MODEL
We consider an ensemble of N agents, where each can invest an amount σ i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , q− 1}, q a fixed integer. This restriction on q has been made for the sake of clarity. The methods employed can be easily generalized to the case where σ i ∈ {d 0 , . . . , d q−1 }, the d i 's being arbitrary real numbers.
The families of conditional probabilities, i.e. the probability that i + 1 would invest σ i+1 given that i invested σ i are chosen as
Our motivation for this particular choice comes from physics, where this probability is interpreted as that of two variables (called classical spins) σ i and σ i+1 being equal or having different values. It depends on two physical parameters: J(σ i ) is the so-called interaction strength. This is in most cases a material-dependent quantity and accounts for the different collective properties materials may exhibit (ferromagnetic, antiferromagnetic, etc.). β is proportional to the inverse temperature T −1 and brings about entropic effects (ordered states for low temperatures and disorder for high temperatures). Being proportional to a temperature, in physical systems β is always non negative, and we likewise assume our
In general J and β can be seen as competing terms: J is associated to the energy cost of a given spin configuration. For J > 0 (< 0) a configuration where spins are equal (different) has a higher energy than the opposite configuration, which means that it is energetically more favorable to be non-magnetic (or ferromagnetic); on the other hand, the temperature β −1 tends to destroy magnetic order. Transposing these ideas to the financial context can say that J(σ i ) measures how strongly people respond to their neighbors' moves, that is if they are susceptible to the influence of other players or not. In this sense it models distinct profiles of investors, which can go from agressive (does not go along "with the pack") to
conservative (does what others do). β is a measure of the strength of individual response and independent of what others do. Social scientists refer to this term as the "individual-specific random" and "unobservable" (from the point of view of the modeler) since it is associated to personal beliefs [5] .
With the neighbor-to-neighbor interaction rule introduced above we can describe the behavior of the whole group: The first important quantity which needs to be defined is the joint probability density (j.p.d), P (σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N ) of a particular investment configuration σ ≡ (σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N ) of a group. The quantity invested is defined through
and we would like to obtain the average value of L.
To calculate the j.p.d we may adopt a recursive formulation without any loss of generality:
we take the investment of the first agent to be exactly σ 1 , i.e., P (σ 1 ) = 1 and from that derive the quantity we want. With this "boundary condition" on P (σ 1 ) we have the following theorem:
Theorem 1 The probability distribution P (σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N ) can be written as a product form
Proof. ¿From the definition
Considering the hypothesis P (σ N |σ 1 , σ 2 , ..., σ N −1 ) = P (σ N |σ N −1 ) we thus have
and applying this recursively:
According to equations (1) and (3) we have
where c N is the normalization constant defined before and such that
A. Investment formulas and the Potts model
The Potts hamiltonian of N interacting spins under the action of a magnetic field D is given by [6] 
The fact that the total investment L (2) is mathematically the same as the magnetization of the Potts hamiltonian (6) means that we may directly transpose the techniques and ideas of statistical mechanics into the financial scenario.
The probability density function for the system to present a specific investment value L is given by
where Z N (β), the normalization constant, is a sum over all possible configurations
and is known as the partition function.
Our aim is to describe how the investment depends on β, given a fixed set of parameters J(1), J(2), ..., J(N). For this purpose, let us consider the expected value of L according to the distribution (7), i.e.
For the sake of those not familiar with the methods of statistical mechanics, we briefly discuss how in our analogy between spin systems and economic games quantities of interest can be calculated:
σ i is introduced for convenience since investment per capita is calculated through the formulae
, which is the analogue in statistical mechanics to the average spontaneous magnetization. It clearly obeys the inequality 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1. Proof. The probability of a given state
For β = 0 all states are equiprobable since, from the equation above, the probability does not depend on σ; hence, the probability of each state is 1/q N . For simplicity we assume that q N is even, the odd case being left to the reader. The per capita investment can be written as
(number of states with sum = i)i
We can see that the number of states corresponding to the sum i is the same as the number corresponding to the sum N(q − 1) − i. Then,
(number of states with sum = i)
since the number of states with sum between 0 and N(q − 1)/2 correspond to (q N )/2.
For arbitrary values of β let us call
. Then, the probability of any state is
In the limit β → ∞, P (σ) = 0 except for the state σ M , where P (σ M ) = 1. Notice that the case where min i J i is reached in more than one point is not covered by the theorem.
In the next section we give a case by case description of investment as a function of β.
To do this we adapt transfer matrix method to our model. Contrary to spin systems, in the present problem nontrivial behavior appears, and this might lead to interesting new possibilities in the scenario of economic games.
III. ANALYTICAL CASES
A. The two state model: q = 2 (Ising Model)
We start by considering the partition function (8)
where σ N +1 = σ 1 (periodic boundary conditions are assumed) and the transfer matrix M is given by
It is possible to diagonalize M and write (9) in terms of eigenvalues λ 1 and λ 2 of M in a simple way
These eigenvalues are given by
One can now write
In the limit of a large group of agents (N → ∞) the expression above converges to
An explicit calculation gives
A few remarks can be drawn from these equations:
1. With the explicit expressions of the eigenvalues one can easily show that
independently of the values of J 0 and J 1 (as expected from the last theorem).
2. When J 0 = J 1 one has ∆ = 4e 2βJ 0 and l(β) = 1/2 for all β ∈ R The other important limit l(β → ∞) has an explicit J i dependence that can be summarized below: One may observe that two cases follow from theorem 3.1: β = 0 and β → ∞ when J < 0.
We have l(0) = 1 and if J < 0, l(β → ∞) = 2. But with the expression for l we can also obtain results beyond the range of the theorem, for example, when J > 0. In this case A straighforward calculation gives
Thus the investment is independent of the parameter J 1 when J 0 = J 2 = 0. As before we have
For l(β) we have the following expression l(β) = 1
The case J > 0 is not covered by theorem 3.1. From the expression above we obtain
The only cases where one has analytical solutions are for q < 4. For other values of q one has to employ numerical methods in order to gain some information, as we discuss in the next section.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
For those cases which are not analytically treatable we can employ an algorithm that combines a routine of numerical derivation with eigenvalues computing. To see how the method work, we first consider the following matrix, written as a function of ξ:
Let λ ξ be the largest eigenvalue corresponding to matrix M(ξ) and λ −ξ the one from M(−ξ).
If ξ << 1 one has:
A numerical estimate to order ( O(ξ 2 ) ) is
A more refined numerical estimate can be obtained using not only two but four points λ ξ , λ −ξ , λ 2ξ and λ −2ξ . 
Theorem 3 Consider a function
Proof. Considering a Taylor expansion
and
Combining the equations (14), (15) and (16), we obtain
which gives us
To assess the applicability and performance of the method, we applied it to the integrable q = 3 case with numerical results using 4-point derivative. In Fig. 3 we show how the numerical results compare with the analytical ones. By using a higher number of points we observe a significant difference on the results (see Fig. 4 ) over selected regions, as compared to a lesser number.
A. Numerical analysis for q > 3 considering distinct profiles of agents
In this section we analyze some numerical results for q > 3. We consider three possible profiles: goes to 0. We then may conclude that conservative agents lead to the situation of complete stagnation as β → ∞ , independent of the number possibilities in the investment q. On the other hand, risk prone agents lead the market to invest the maximum at this limit.
An alternative profile seems to be more appropriate: The random profile (3) was also explored in an experiment using 12 seeds (12 different random choices of the string J(σ i ), Our results indicate that the behavior of each investor is key to determining the dy- namics of the market. As recent results in the context of agents' simulation show [1] , pure mathematical models can capture some of the intrincacies of real markets when they, as pointed out in [5] , try to include real people's idiosyncrasies (beliefs, sentiments, etc.) that are known to play a significant role (not to mention other important influences as seasonable changes in production, political turmoil, and the like). Even though our model is still mathematical, in the sense that it is based on a well known model of statistical mechanics and we identify behavior in terms of known physical quantities, we believe that our ideas might help indicate a way towards a more realistic market modelling.
